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The paper surveys the main contributions of new economic geography from the point of view of 
transport analysis. It shows that decreasing transport costs is likely to exacerbate regional 
disparities. However, very low transport costs should foster a more balanced distribution for 
economic activities across space. Thus, the spatial curve of development, which relates the 
degree of spatial concentration to the level of transport costs, would be bell-shaped. The paper 
also provides a detailed discussion of the main determinants of transport costs, which remain 
fairly large in most countries. It concludes with a discussion of some policy implications. 
Key-words: economic geography, transport costs, regional disparities 
JEL classification: L91, R12, R58 
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Just as matter in the solar system is concentrated in a small number of bodies (the 
planets and their satellites), economic life is concentrated in a fairly limited number of 
human settlements (cities and clusters). The main purpose of economic geography is to 
explain why human activity is unevenly distributed across places and formed a large 
variety of economic agglomerations. Although using “agglomeration” as a generic term is 
convenient at a certain level of abstraction, it must be kept in mind that this concept 
refers to very distinct real world situations. At one extreme of the spectrum lies the 
North-South divide. At the other, restaurants, movie theaters, or shops selling similar 
products are often clustered within the same neighborhood, not to say on the same 
street. 
 
In the foregoing examples, what drives the location of firms and consumers is the 
accessibility to spatially dispersed markets, a fact that has been recognized for long 
both in spatial economics and regional science (Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Accessibility is 
itself measured by all the costs generated by the various types of spatial frictions that 
economic agents face in the exchange process. In the case of goods and services, such 
costs are called trade costs. Spulber (2007) refers to them as “the four Ts”: 
(i)Transaction costs that result from doing business at a distance due to differences in 
customs, business practices, as well as political and legal climates; (ii)Tariff and non-
tariff costs such as different anti-pollution standards, anti-dumping practices, and the 
massive regulations that still restrict trade and investment; (iii)Transport costs per se 
because goods have to reach their consumption place, while many services remain non-
tradable; and (iv)Time costs as, despite Internet and video-conferences, there are still 
communication impediments across dispersed distribution and manufacturing facilities 
that slow down reactions to changes in market conditions, while the time needed to ship 
certain types of goods has a high value. Because they stand for the costs of 
coordinating and connecting transactions between supplier and customer locations, 
trade costs are likely to stay on the center stage as they are crucial to the global firm. 
For example, trade and marketing costs accounts for 70% of the retail price of a 
Barbie doll (Spulber, 2007). Regarding the purpose of this chapter, it should be clear 
that trade costs, being the inherent attribute of exchanges across locations, are also 
central to the development of economic geography and its various applications.
1
 
All distance-related costs having dramatically decreased with technological advances in 
transportation and the development of the new communication technologies (see, e.g. 
Bairoch, 1997),
  the following question suggests itself: what is the impact of falling 
transport and communication costs on  he location of economic activity? Not 
surprisingly, but often forgotten, the answer depends on the spatial scale of analysis 
(Anas et al., 1998). New economic geography (henceforth NEG) is designed to operate 
t
                                                 
1  Trade costs involve both additive and multiplicative terms with respect to the mill price of goods, as excise 
and ad valorem taxes. Behrens (2006) has shown that both specifications lead to similar results regarding the 









































1at the regional level, thus implying that the focus is on interregional relationships.
2 
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  o n c e  i t  i s  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  trading goods is costly, it must equally be 
acknowledged that spatial frictions matter to firms and workers. Accordingly, NEG 





                                                
 
Another fundamental ingredient of the space-economy is that production must display 
increasing returns to scale, meaning that a proportional increase of all inputs yields a 
more than proportional increase of output. Otherwise, it would always be preferable to 
subdivide firms up to the point where all consumption places would accommodate very 
small units producing only for the local customers. Firms and households would thus 
reduce trade and their transport expenditures to zero, a situation that may be 
referred to as backyard capitalism. However, once economic activities are not perfectly 
divisible, the transport of goods or people between some places becomes unavoidable 
because production arises only in a few places. 
 
It has been recognized for long that the trade-off between increasing returns in 
production and transport cos s is central  o the understanding of the geography of 
economic activities (Koopmans, 1957; Krugman, 1995). As transport costs increase with 
distance, each plant supplies consumers located within a certain radius whose length 
depends on the relative level of freight costs and the intensity of increasing returns, 
whereas those located beyond this radius are supplied by other units. By modifying both 
transport costs and firms' technologies, the Industrial Revolution has deeply affected 
the terms of the above-mentioned trade-off in a way that is not easy to predict. 
 
Even though it is true that economic activities are, at least to some extent, spatially 
concentrated because of natural features (think of rivers and harbors), it is reasonable 
to believe that these features explain only a fraction of the magnitude of regional 
disparities. This is why NEG has chosen to focus on pure economic mechanisms relying 
on the trade-off between increasing returns and different types of mobility costs. To 
achieve its goal, NEG borrows at will concepts and tools from microeconomics, trade 
theories and industrial organization. Although, as always in economics, everything 
depends on everything, geographical economics adds a new element to this: in all places, 
what is nearby has more influence than what is far away. Such a postulate concurs with 
the gravity prediction, that is, the intensity of flows of people, goods and ideas 
between two places is positively affected by their respective size and negatively by the 
distance separating them.  
 
And indeed, in a world in which the tyranny of distance would be disappearing, empirical 
applications of gravity models run against this idea by showing that distance and 
borders remain major impediments to  rade and interactions between spatially 
 
2  This choice of a macroscopic scale allows us to avoid looking closely at the goings-on inside agglomerations. 










































1separated firms and consumers (Head and Mayer, 2004). In the same vein, Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2004) provide a very detailed estimate of trade costs and conclude 
that they would reach a level approximately equal to 170% of the average mill price of 
manufactured goods (the variance across goods is high, however). This estimate can be 
broken down into 55% arising from internal costs and 74% from international costs 
(1.7=1.55×1.74-1). The international costs are broken down in turn into 21% arising from 
transport costs and 44% from costs connected with border effects (1.74=1.21×1.44). 
Tariff and non-tariff barriers account for 8% of the border effects (exceptionally 10 
or 20% in the case of developing countries), language differences for 7%, currency 
differences for 14% and other costs, including information, for 9% (all in all, 
1.44=1.08×1.07×1.14×1.09). Hence, the share of transport costs in the consumer price of 
manufactured goods remains high. We will return to this topic in Section 5. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section uses historical 
data to show that falling transport costs may be associated with rising spatial 
inequalities over very long periods. Section 3 provides an overview of the main 
explanations proposed by NEG to explain the emergence of a core-periphery structure 
in a world characterized by decreasing transport and communication costs. Specifically, 
we survey a large range of issues involving mobile physical capital or mobile human 
capital. The material presented in this section suggests that falling transport costs 
foster the agglomeration of the mobile production factor in a small number of regions. 
However, adding more relevant variables to the canonical core-periphery model leads us 
to qualify this conclusion. More precisely, we will see in Section 4 that, once obstacles 
to trade are sufficiently low, spatial inequalities might well vanish. Hence, falling 
transport and communication costs would be associated with a bell-shaped curve of 
spatial development: Spatial inequalities would first rise and then fall. This is confirmed 
by the evolution of the spatial pattern of activities within France: taking 1860 as our 
benchmark, Combes et al. (2008b) observe that manufacturing activities are more 
concentrated in 1930 and more dispersed in 2000 than in 1860. Several factors can 
explain why this could be so: (i) workers have different matches with regions, (ii) non-
traded goods, especially housing, have higher prices in big agglomerations, (iii) firms 
belonging to the intermediate and final sectors compete for workers, and (iv) firms 
fragment their activities across spatially separated units. Section 5 has two related 
purposes. It provides an overview on how transport costs are modeled and measured, 
and describes the results derived from the use of such measures in a few empirical 
attempts to validate NEG models. Section 6 discusses some implications of NEG for 
transport economics and policy.
 







3  It should also be stressed that NEG is closely related to location theory and regional science. These links 
cannot be discussed here. The reader is referred to Ottaviano and Thisse (2005) for a detailed discussion of 









































12. The rise of spatial inequalities in pre-World War I Europe 
 
What makes NEG relevant to economists, transport-analysts and policy-makers is the 
fact that the process of economic development is spatially uneven. To illustrate this 
phenomenon, it is worth looking at the estimates, provided by Bairoch (1997), of the 
GDP per capita over the period 1800-1913. This corresponds to a period of intense 
technological progress that preceded a long series of political disturbances; they are 
given in Table 1. Even if these numbers must be used cautiously, they reveal clear 
tendencies. 
 
Countries  1800  1830 1850 1870 1890 1900 1913 
Austria-Hungary  200  240 275 310 370 425 510 
Belgium  200  240 335 450 55  650 815 
Bulgaria  175  185 205 225 260 275 285 
Denmark  205  225 280 365 525 655 885 
Finland  180  190 230 300 370 430 525 
France  205  275 345 450 525 610 670 
Germany  200  240 305 425 540 645 790 
Greece  190  195 220 255 300 310 335 
Italy  220  240 260 300 315 345 455 
Netherlands  270  320 385 470 570 610 740 
Norway  185  225 285 340 430 475 615 
Portugal  230  250 275 290 295 320 335 
Romania  190  195 205 225 265 300 370 
Russia  170  180 190 220 210 260 340 
Serbia  185  200 215 235 260 270 300 
Spain  210  250 295 315 325 365 400 
Sweden  195  235 270 315 405 495 705 
Switzerland  190  240 340 485 645 730 895 
United  Kingdom  240  355 470 650 815 915 1035 
Mean  200  240 285 350 400 465 550 
Standard deviation  24 43  68  110 155 182 229 
 
              Table 1: Per capita GDP of European countries expressed in 1960 U.S. dollars and prices 
 
First, in 1800, most countries, except the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, the 
United Kingdom, had fairly similar incomes per capita. As the Industrial Revolution 
developed and spread across the continent, each country experienced growth: the 
average GDP increases from 200 dollars in 1800 to 550 dollars in 1913. However, the 
process of economic growth also affected countries in a very unequal way. This is made 
clear by the range of standard deviations for each column, which rose from 24 to 229. 
The coefficient of variation increases steadily from 0.12 to 0.42, which confirms the 
existence of strongly rising spatial inequalities. 
 
Second, countries with the highest growth rates are those located close to the United 
Kingdom, which became the center of the global economy of the nineteenth century. 









































1on the logarithm of the distance to the UK, which shows that the impact of this 
variable is significantly negative. Moreover, the absolute value of this regression 
coefficient, which has the meaning of elasticity, rises from 0.090 in 1800 and reaches a 
peak equal to 0.426 in 1890 (and remains stable afterwards). Stated differently, 
before the Industrial Revolution, a decrease of 10% in the distance to the UK is 
accompanied by an increase of the GDP per capita equal to 0.9%. By World War I this 
elasticity had reached 4.4%, thus showing how far spatial inequalities had evolved 
during the 19th century. 
 
Therefore, we may safely conclude that the process of economic growth is localized, 
while the relative rates of economic growth among nations have been strongly related to 
their distance to the center of the European economy. It is worth stressing here that 
the emergence of such a core-periphery structure arose while transport costs were 
falling at a historically unprecedented rate. For example, Bairoch (1997) estimates that, 
on the whole, between 1800 and 1910, the reduction in the real average prices of 
transportation was on the order of 10 to 1. Hence, while the European economy 
experienced a rapid growth, this phenomenal decrease in transport costs did not trigger 
a more or less even distribution of wealth across nations. We will see below how NEG 
can explain this seemingly paradoxical result. 
 
 
3. Do lower transport costs foster more spatial inequality? 
 
Regional economics has long been dominated by the neoclassical model in which 
technologies display constant returns to scale and markets operate under perfect 
competition. In such a setting, regional wage differences push and pull workers until 
wages are equalized between regions. Simultaneously, capital flows from regions where 
it is abundant to regions where it is scarce. In equilibrium, the capital/labor ratio is 
equal across regions and both factors receive the same return in each region. This 
model is, therefore, unable to account for both the international discrepancies 
described in section 2 and the development of interregional trade, thus pointing to the 
need for an alternative approach. 
 
There is a broad consensus among economists and geographers to consider the space-
economy as the outcome of a process involving two types of opposing forces: 
agglomeration  forces and dispersion  forces (Papageorgiou and Smith, 1983). The 
resulting spatial distribution of economic activities is thus a complex balance between 
these forces that push and pull both consumers and firms.
4 What NEG intends to do is 
to determine the nature of these forces at the multi-regional level and the way in which 
they interact. This appears to be a difficult task since the cause often becomes the 
effect, and vice versa, thereby making the relationship of causality circular and the 
                                                 










































1process of spatial development cumulative. This is precisely what Krugman (1991, p.486) 
means when he writes "manufactures production will tend to concentrate where there is 
a large market, but the market will be large where manufactures production is 
concentrated."  
 
In general, the intensity of agglomeration and dispersion forces decreases with 
transport costs. Although it is precisely their balance that determines the shape of the 
space-economy, there is no clear indication regarding the relative intensity of those 
forces as transport costs decrease. This is why the main questions that NEG addresses 
keep their relevance: when do we observe an agglomerated or a dispersed pattern of 
production at the interregional level, and what is the impact that decreasing transport 
and communication costs have on the intensity of the agglomeration and dispersion 
forces operating at that spatial scale. To this end, NEG uses a simple setting borrowed 
from modern trade theories, in which the impact of a wide range of agglomeration and 
dispersion forces may be discussed.
 
 
3.1 The basic framework 
 
In this section and the next one, our frame of reference involves two regions, two 
sectors, called agriculture and manufacturing, and two production factors.
5 The 
agricultural sector produces a homogeneous good under constant returns and perfect 
competition, whereas the manufacturing sector produces a differentiated good under 
increasing returns and monopolistic competition. There are several reasons for using 
monopolistic competition as a market structure. First, firms are endowed with monopoly 
power on the product market because they sell differentiated varieties. That firms 
choose to sell differentiated products reflects the fundamental fact that consumers 
have either a love for variety or different ideal products.
6 As a matter of fact, both 
economists and business analysts see product variety as one of the main gains of trade 
and economic integration (Spulber, 2007). Thanks to their market power, firms’ 
operating profits allow them to cover their fixed production costs. Second, because 
there is a continuum of firms, each one is negligible to the market. This makes 
interactions among firms much easier to handle than in spatial competition theory, 
which is often plagued with the non-existence of equilibrium (d’Aspremont et al., 1979). 
When labor is homogeneous, firms have no market power on the labor market and are, 
therefore, wage-takers. This in turn allows for a general equilibrium analysis involving 
firms that produce under increasing returns and act on both the product and labor 
markets, something that is still out of reach when firms operate under oligopolistic 
competition. Last, the fact that firms located in the same region supply a range of 
                                                 
5  Note that the interpretation of the two sectors and production factors used here is not crucial for the argument. 
It is made for expositional convenience, the critical point being that one factor is mobile and the other 
immobile. For example, the immobile factor could be land or non-tradable services.  









































1differentiated products captures the idea that a big regional agglomeration makes a 
wide set of opportunities available to the consumers/workers living in that region.
7  
 
3.2 The mobility of capital 
 
As said above, NEG deals with the mobility of goods and factors. To start with, we 
consider the case of goods and capital because it is easier to handle. In contrast to 
standard trade theory, firms are now free to choose their locations and they set up 
where their profits are highest. However, consumers/workers continue to be immobile. 
Furthermore, the mobility of manufactured goods is constrained by positive transport 
costs. It is, therefore, tempting to conclude that the region with the larger market will 
always attract firms because this location minimizes transport costs borne by firms in 
supplying both markets. However, this argument ignores the fact that when more firms 
locate within the same region, local competition is intensified and profits are depressed. 
The spatial distribution of firms then arises from the balancing of two opposite forces: 
the agglomeration force is generated by each firm’s desire for market access, whereas 
the dispersion force finds its origin in each firm’s desire to relax competition by moving 
away from competitors. 
 
When one region is larger in terms of population and purchasing power, the push and pull 
system reaches equilibrium when this region attracts a more than proportional share of 
firms, a property that has been coined the “home market effect” (Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985; Combes et al., 2008c). Because of its comparative advantage in terms of 
size, it seems natural that this region should attract more firms. What is less expected 
is that the share of firms exceeds the relative size of this region, thus implying that 
the initial advantage is magnified. 
 
As the large region is also the one that offers the wider array of varieties, it is a net 
exporter of the manufactured good and a net importer of the agricultural good. The 
two regions are, therefore, partially specialized: the large one in the production of the 
manufactured good and the small one in that of the agricultural good. This type of 
specialization owes nothing to a Ricardian comparative advantage, the nature of the 
forces at work here being totally different. Indeed, they rest here on the interplay 
between the market-access and market-crowding effects, the balance of which is 
endogenous. 
 
The intensity of the home market effect varies with the level of transport costs: when 
economic integration gets deeper, the intensity of the agglomeration force increases 
whereas the intensity of the dispersion force decreases. This result can be understood 
as follows. On the one hand, a higher degree of integration makes exports to the small 
                                                 
7  Spatial competition models allow for a richer description of market interactions among firms but remain 
confined to partial equilibrium settings that do not cope with the labor market. Interestingly, the conclusions 









































1market easier, which allows firms to exploit more intensively their scale economies; on 
the other hand, the deepening of integration reduces the advantages associated with 
geographical isolation in the small market where there is less competition. These two 
effects push toward more agglomeration of the manufacturing sector, thus implying 
that, as transport costs go down, the small region gets de-industrialized to the benefit 
of the large one. 
 
Equally important are the implications of that result for people’s well-being. Even 
though all consumers will benefit from lower transport costs, those in the larger region 
will achieve the greatest benefits from their direct access to a wider array of 
products. This has an unexpected implication, that is, building new and more efficient 
transport infrastructure may exacerbate spatial inequalities. Stated differently, 
lowering transport costs enhances the mobility of capital, rather than substitutes for 
it, and makes the two economies less similar. It also leads to over-agglomeration of the 
manufacturing sector in the large region (Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005). Hence, 
contrary to general beliefs, better transport infrastructure may exacerbate regional 
disparities. For example, the unification of Italy and the construction of a national 
railway system in the 19
th century had fostered the de-industrialization of the 
Mezzogiorno at the benefit of Northern Italy. We will return to this important issue 
later in this chapter. 
 
3.3 The mobility of labor 
 
While the movement of capital to a region brings with it the benefits of added 
production capability, the returns from this capital need not be spent in the same 
region. By contrast, when skilled workers move to a new region, they bring with them 
both their production and consumption capabilities. As a result, their movements 
simultaneously affect the size of labor and product markets in both the origin and 
destination regions. This is the main difference between capital and labor mobility.   
Another is that the mobility of capital is driven by differences in nominal returns, 
whereas workers move when there is a positive difference in real wages. This is because 
differences in living costs matter to workers who consume in the region where they 
work, but not to capital-owners who consume their income in their region of residence, 
which need not be the region where their capital is invested.
 
 
This is the starting point for Krugman’s 1991 paper. When some workers choose to 
migrate, their move affects the welfare of those who stay put. Indeed, as said above, 
their migrations change the relative attractiveness of both origin and destination 
regions. These effects have the nature of pecuniary externalities because workers do 
not take these effects into account in making their decision to migrate. Moreover, such 
externalities are of particular importance when markets are imperfectly competitive 
because market prices fail to reflect the true social value of individual decisions. This is 









































1encapsulating the interactions between product and labor markets, but which must also 
account for the fact that individuals are both workers and consumers. 
 
In Krugman’s model, one factor (farmers) is spatially immobile and used as an input in 
the agricultural sector; the second factor (workers) is spatially mobile and used as an 
input in the manufactured sector. In what has come to be known as the core-periphery 
model, two major effects are at work: one involves firms and the other workers. 
Assume that one region becomes slightly bigger than the other. First, this increase in 
market size leads to a higher demand for the manufactured good. Given what we have 
seen in sub-section 3.2, this increase in market size generates a more than 
proportionate increase in the share of firms, thus pushing nominal wages up. Second, 
the presence of more firms means a greater variety of local products and, therefore, a 
lower local price index – a cost-of-living effect. Accordingly, real wages should rise, and 
this region should attract a new flow of workers. The combination of these two effects 
should reinforce each of its components and lead to the eventual agglomeration of all 
firms and workers in a single region - the core of the economy, while the other regions 
form the periphery. 
 
Even though this process seems to generate a “snow ball” effect, it is not obvious that 
it will always develop according to that prediction. Indeed, the foregoing argument has 
ignored several key impacts of migration on the labor market. On the one hand, the 
increased supply of labor in the region of destination will tend to push wages down. On 
the other hand, since new workers are also consumers, there may be an increase in local 
demand for the manufactured good that leads to a higher demand for labor. So the 
final impact on nominal wages is hard to predict. Likewise, there is increased 
competition in the product market, which makes the region less attractive to firms. The 
combination of all those effects may lead to a “snowball meltdown”, which results in the 
spatial dispersion of firms and workers. 
 
Turning next to the specific conditions for agglomeration or dispersion to arise, 
Krugman and others have shown that the level of transport costs is the key parameter 
(Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 1999; Combes et al., 2008c). On the one hand, if transport 
costs are sufficiently high, interregional shipments of goods are discouraged, which 
strengthens the dispersion force. The economy then displays a symmetric regional 
p a t t e r n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  w h i c h  f i r m s  f o c u s  m a i n l y  o n  l o c a l  m a r k e t s .   B e c a u s e  t h e  
distribution of workers is the same within each region, spatial disparities vanish in that 
there are no interregional price and wage differentials. As in new trade theories, there 
is intra-industry trade. Integration has only positive effects provided that the spatial 
pattern remains the same. 
-
 
On the other hand, if transport costs are sufficiently low, then all manufacturing firms 
will concentrate into the core, while the periphery supplies only the agricultural good. In 
this way, firms are able to exploit increasing returns by selling more goods in the larger 









































1region with and the periphery a region without a major urban center. It is worth 
stressing here that the core-periphery structure emerges as the equilibrium balance of 
a system of opposite forces. Spatial inequalities reflect here the uneven distribution of 
jobs across regions and arise as the involuntary consequence of decisions made by a 
myriad of economic agents pursuing their own interests. The resulting pattern of trade 
now involves intersectoral trade because one region has built a Ricardian comparative 
advantage in producing the manufactured good. Note, however, that this advantage is 
not exogenous but endogenous. 
 
As illustrated by Figure 1, high transport costs sustain a pattern in which activities are 
equally split between the two regions, meaning that the share of the manufacturing 
sector is 1/2 in each region. At the other extreme of the spectrum, low transport costs 
foster the agglomeration of activities within a single region, hence implying that the 
share is either 0 or 1. For intermediate values, both configurations are stable equilibria, 
in which case the actual spatial pattern heavily depends on history. Those spatial 
patterns of production, as well as the conditions under which they emerge, provide a 




Figure 1. Transport costs and industry share when labor is mobile 
 
Thus, the mobility of labor exacerbates the general tendencies uncovered in sub-
section 3.2, the reason being that the size of local markets changes with labor 
migration. For such self-reinforcing changes to occur, it must be that trading between 
regions becomes sufficiently cheap. Putting all these results together shows that 
lowering transport costs first leaves the location of economic activity unchanged, and 
then gives rise to a snowball effect that stops only when an extreme form of economic 










































1One important implication of the cumulative causation triggered by the interplay of 
agglomeration and dispersion forces is the emergence of what can be called putty-clay 
geography. Even though firms are a priori footloose, once the agglomeration process is 
set into motion, it keeps developing within the same region. Individual choices become 
more rigid because of the self-reinforcing nature of the agglomeration mechanism (the 
snowball effect mentioned above). In other words, the process of agglomeration sparks 
a lock-in effect. Hence, although firms and workers are (almost) freed from natural 
constraints, they are still connected through more complex networks of interactions, 
which are more difficult to unearth than the standard location factors related to the 
supply of natural resources. 
 
3.4 A welfare analysis of the core-periphery model 
 
Whether there is too much or too little agglomeration is an issue that has never been in 
short supply and it is fair to say that this is one of the main questions that policy-
makers would like to address. The core-periphery model shows that migration is not 
necessarily a force pushing for the equalization of standards of living. It may just as 
well reduce gaps in welfare levels as exacerbate regional disparities. Besides the 
standard inefficiencies generated by firms pricing above marginal costs, Krugman’s 
model contains new sources of inefficiency stemming from agents’ mobility. Firms and 
workers move without taking into account the benefits and losses they generate for 
b o t h  t h e  h o s t  a n d  d e p a r t u r e  r e g i o n s .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  i f  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  e x p e c t  t h e  
market outcome to be inefficient, there is a priori no general indication as to the social 
desirability of agglomeration or dispersion. 
 
Before proceeding, a warning is in order: both the planner seeking to maximize global 
efficiency and the market work with the same agglomeration and dispersion forces. 
Since the planning optimum and the market equilibrium depend on the fundamental 
characteristics of the economy, the agglomeration and dispersion forces discussed 
above are to be taken into account in both cases. What makes the two solutions 
different is the institutional mechanism used to solve the trade-off between these 
forces. Such a difference is often poorly understood, thus leading the public and some 
policy-makers to believe that the socially optimal pattern of activities has nothing to do 
with what the free play of market forces yields. In particular, agglomeration may be 
socially efficient. This is so when transport costs are sufficiently low. The reason is 
simple to grasp: firms are able to take advantage of the larger market created by their 
concentration to exploit scale economies, while guaranteeing the inhabitants of the 
periphery a good access to their products. 
 
Unfortunately, welfare analyses do not deliver a simple and unambiguous message about 
the equilibrium spatial pattern of economic activity in the core-periphery model. 
Neither of the two possible equilibria - agglomeration or dispersion - Pareto dominates 
the other, because farmers living in the periphery always prefer dispersion, whereas 









































1compare these two market outcomes, Charlot et al. (2006) use compensation 
mechanisms put forward in public economics to evaluate the social desirability of a 
move, using market prices and equilibrium wages to compute the compensations to be 
paid either by those who gain from the move (Kaldor), or by those who would be hurt by 
the move (Hicks). They show that, once transport costs are sufficiently low, 
agglomeration is preferred to dispersion in that farmers and workers in the core can 
compensate farmers staying in the periphery. However, the latter are unable to 
compensate farmers and workers who would choose to form what becomes the core. 
This implies that none of the two configurations is preferred to the other with respect 
to the two criteria. Such indeterminacy may be viewed as the "resolution" of the much 
contrasted views that prevail in a domain in which the two tenets have many good 
reasons to be right. 
 
This indeterminacy may be resolved by resorting to specific social welfare functions. 
Charlot et al. consider the CES family that encapsulates different attitudes toward 
inequality across individuals, and includes the utilitarian and Rawlsian criteria as polar 
cases. As expected, the relative merits of agglomeration then critically depend on 
societal values. If society does not care much about inequality across individuals, 
agglomeration (respectively, dispersion) is socially desirable once transport costs are 
below (respectively, above) some threshold, the value of which depends on the 
fundamental parameters of the economy. Even though these results are derived from 
social preferences defined on individualistic utilities, it is worth noting that they lead 
to policy recommendations that can be regarded as being region-based. This is because 
the market yields much contrasted distributions of income in the core-periphery 
structure, which correspond to equally contrasted distributions of skills between 
regions, as illustrated by Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) for England, and by Combes 
et al. (2008a) for France. 
 
When individual preferences are quasi-linear, one may go one step further because the 
total surplus is measured by the sum of individual utilities across regions and groups of 
workers. In this case, it is possible to determine some clear-cut and suggestive results 
(Ottaviano and Thisse, 2002). First, workers do not necessarily benefit from their 
concentration into a single region. Indeed, as said above, they do not account for the 
impact of their migration on their collective welfare, which typically differs from their 
individual welfare. This difference arises, on the one hand, because of the intensified 
competition that affects prices and wages and, on the other, because of the larger size 
of the regional markets for both products and labor. The net effect is, therefore, a 
priori undetermined. It has been shown, however, that the net effect is negative when 
transport costs take intermediate values. This is so because agglomeration leads to very 
low prices, whence very low wages, thus implying that the collective gains associated 
with agglomeration do not permit any compensation for the resulting social losses. By 
contrast, when transport costs are very low, both the market solution and the social 
optimum involve the agglomeration of the manufactured sector. This means that the 









































1Of course, for this to arise, interregional transfers from the core to the periphery are 
to be implemented. 
 
This is not the end of the story, however. Once local interactions and knowledge 
spillovers among firms are taken into account, the market outcome is likely to exhibit 
under-agglomeration for a wider range of transport cost values (Belleflamme et al., 
2000).
8 Although the process of interaction goes both ways, firms worry only about 
their role as "receivers" but tend to neglect the fact that they are also "transmitters" 
to the others. Furthermore, at the optimum, prices are set at the marginal cost level, 
while locations are chosen so as to maximize the difference between the benefits of 
agglomeration and total transport costs. By contrast, at the market outcome, firms 
take advantage of their spatial separation to relax price competition and, whence, to 
make higher profits. These interactions yield clusters that are too small from the social 
point of view. In a setting involving a housing market, this result is confirmed by Pflüger 
and Südekum (2008) who show that there is under-agglomeration for low trade costs 
(see also Helpman, 2000). 
 
3.5 A growth approach to regional disparities 
 
One may wonder what the implications of the core-periphery model become once we 
allow the manufacturing sector to expand through the entry of new firms and a larger 
number of varieties. The main question is now to figure out how growth and location 
affect each other. More precisely, do regional discrepancies widen or fall over time, and 
what are the main reasons for such an evolution? To answer these questions, the core-
periphery model is grafted onto an endogenous growth model involving an R&D sector, 
such as those developed in Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
 
The R&D sector uses workers as its sole input to produce patents that manufacturing 
firms must buy to enter the product market. The price of a patent is the equivalent of 
the firms’ fixed production cost in the core-periphery model. Hence, the number of 
manufacturing firms is now variable. Farmers can work indifferently in the agricultural 
or manufacturing sectors, where they are paid the same wage. Although the frame of 
reference remains very much the same as in the core-periphery model, new issues arise 
because workers are free to move back and forth between regions over time, thus 
changing the location of the R&D sector. 
 
Fujita and Thisse (2002) show that, at the steady-state, the spatial distribution of the 
R&D sector remains the same over time while the total number of 
patents/varieties/firms grows at a constant rate. The growth rate is measured by the 
variation in the number of varieties and changes with the spatial distribution of 
workers. In other words, the growth of the global economy depends on i s spatial  t
                                                 
8  Note, however, that the progressive decrease of communication costs is likely to spread the extent of 









































1organization. When patents can be used indifferently in either region, the market 
outcome is such that the entire R&D activity is always concentrated into a single region.  
Furthermore, the manufacturing sector is fully or partially agglomerated in the same 
region as the R&D sector, depending on the level of transport costs. Thus, the 
existence of a R&D sector is a strong agglomeration force, which magnifies the circular 
causation pinned down in the core-periphery model. 
 
This result gives credence to the existence of a trade-off between growth and spatial 
equity. However, unlike what the analysis of the core-periphery model suggests, the 
welfare analysis performed by Fujita and Thisse supports the idea that the additional 
growth spurred by agglomeration may lead to a Pareto-dominant outcome. Specifically, 
when the economy moves from dispersion to agglomeration, innovation follows a faster 
pace. As a consequence, even those who stay put in the periphery are better off than 
under dispersion, provided that the growth effect triggered by agglomeration is strong 
enough. It is worth stressing here that this Pareto-dominance property does not 
require any interregional transfers: It is a pure effect of market interaction. 
 
Clearly, the farmers living in the core of the economy enjoy a higher level of welfare 
than those in the periphery. Yet, even though agglomeration generates more growth and 
makes everybody better off, the gap enlarges between the core and the periphery. 
Hence, agglomeration gives rise to regressive effects in terms of spatial equity, one 
region being much richer than the other. Such widening welfare gaps may call for 
corrective policies, but such policies might in turn hurt growth and, thus, individual 
welfare. Note, finally, that regional income discrepancies again reflect the spatial 
distribution of jobs and skills. Core and periphery welfares diverge because faster 




4. The bell-shaped curve of spatial development 
 
4.1 Imperfect labor mobility 
 
In the foregoing section, workers are assumed to have the same preferences. Although 
this assumption is not uncommon in economic modeling, it is highly implausible that all 
potentially mobile individuals will react in the same way to a given "economic gap" 
between regions. Some people show a high degree of attachment to the region where 
they are born; they will stay put even though they may guarantee to themselves higher 
living standards in another region. In the same spirit, lifetime considerations such as 
marriage, divorce and the like play an important role in the decision to migrate 
(Greenwood, 1997). Note, finally, that regions are not similar and exhibit different 
natural and cultural features, whereas people value differently local and cultural 
amenities. Typically, individuals exhibit idiosyncratic tastes about such attributes, so 









































1their decision to move or not. In particular, as argued in hedonic models of migration, 
once individual welfare levels get sufficiently high through the steady increase of 
income, workers tend to pay more attention to the non-market attributes of their 
environment (Knapp and Graves, 1989).  
 
Although individual motivations are difficult to model because they are many and often 
non-observable, it turns out to be possible to identify their aggregate impact on the 
spatial distribution of economic activities by using discrete choice theory, which aims at 
predicting the aggregate behavior of individuals facing mutually exclusive choices 
(Anderson et al., 1992; Train, 2003). In other words, a discrete choice model can be 
used to capture the aggregate matching between individuals and regions.
9 Building on 
this idea, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) have combined the core-periphery model of 
section 3.2 with the logit model of discrete choice theory in order to assess the impact 
of heterogeneity in migration behavior. In such a context, interregional migrations 
become sluggish, which in turn generates a very different global pattern: the industry





Figure 2. Transport costs and industry share when labor is imperfectly mobile 
 
As transport costs steadily decline, more and more firms get agglomerated in one 
region for the reasons explained in sub-section 3.2, but the agglomeration process is 
now gradual and smooth. However, full agglomeration never arises because some 
workers have a very good match with their region of origin and choose not to migrate. 
                                                 
9  It is worth mentioning that such a modeling strategy agrees with the rich body of literature, known as spatial 
interaction theory, which has been developed by geographers and transport analysts (Wilson, 1970; Anas, 
1983). Indeed, besides workers’ location choices, trade flows also obey a structure akin to this theory as they 
are generated by consumers who have a preference for variety. Thus, the kind of approach proposed here 









































1After having reached a peak, the manufacturing sector gradually gets re-dispersed. 
This is because the non-economic factors that drive the choice of a residential location 
become predominant and take over the economic forces stressed by NEG, the intensity 
of which decreases with falling transport costs. As a result, the relationship between 
the degree of spatial concentration and the level of transport costs is bell-shaped (see 
Figure 2 for an illustration). Furthermore, the domain over which this curve develops 
shrinks as the population becomes more heterogeneous, confirming once more the 
importance of the type of labor mobility. Therefore, idiosyncratic factors in migration 
decisions act as a strong dispersion force and change the global pattern of location 
decisions into a bell-shaped curve. 
 
                                                
 
4.2 The role of non-tradable goods 
 
Tradable goods do not account for a very large fraction of the GDP of developed 
countries. On the contrary, many consumption goods and services are produced locally 
and not traded between regions. The forces pushing toward factor price equalization 
within every region thus lead to additional costs generated by the agglomeration of 
firms and workers within the same region. This in turn increases the cost of living in the 
large region and may induce some workers to change place. A natural way to capture this 
phenomenon is to focus on the land market where competition gets tougher, hence the 
land rent rises, as more people establish themselves in the same area. Indeed, as argued 
in urban economics, a growing flow of workers makes commuting and housing costs 
higher in the city that accommodates the new comers (Fujita, 1989). 
 
When firms set up within a central business district, workers distribute themselves 
around this center and commute on a daily basis. Competition for land generates a land 
rent whose value decreases as the distance to the employment center rises. This implies 
that, both the land rent and the average commuting cost are shifted upward when more 
workers reside in the city. Eventually, as the population keeps rising, the costs borne by 
workers within the agglomeration become too high to be compensated by a better 
access to the array of tradable goods. Therefore, dispersion arises once shipping costs 
have reached a sufficiently low level by comparison with commuting costs (Tabuchi, 
1998; Ottaviano et al., 2002). Lower urban costs in the periphery more than offset the 
additional transport costs to be paid for consuming the varieties produced in the other 
region. Consequently, as transport costs fall, the economy involves dispersion, 
agglomeration, and re-dispersion. This is strikingly similar to what we have seen in sub-




Two final comments are in order. First, the redispersion process across regions depends 
on the efficiency of urban transport infrastructures, thus showing why urban and 
 
10  Negative externalities arising in the urban agglomeration, such as transport congestion, pollution and a high 









































1interregional transport policies should be coordinated. If commuting costs are low 
(respectively, high), the agglomeration will remain the equilibrium outcome for a wider 
(respectively, narrower) range of transport cost values, as illustrated by the emergence 
of large polycentric metropolises in the US (Anas et al. 1998). The relocation of 
manufactured activities away from large metropolitan areas toward medium-sized cities 
provides an example of the impact that high commuting costs may have on firms’ 
locations (Henderson, 1997). Second, the burden of urban costs may be alleviated when 
secondary employment centers are created. Such a morphological change in the urban 
structure, which makes the city polycentric, slows down the re-dispersion process and 
allows the agglomeration to maintain, at least to a large extent, its supremacy (Cavailhès 
et al., 2007). This draws attention to two facts that transport analysts often neglect: 
on the one hand, the local mobility of people (i.e. commuting) may affect the global 
organization of the economy and, on the other hand, the global mobility of commodities 
is likely to have an impact on the local organization of production and employment.  
 
4.3 Vertical linkages 
 
So far in the analysis, agglomeration is driven by the endogeneity of the size of local 
markets caused by the mobility of consumers/workers. When labor is immobile across 
regions but mobile between sectors, the cumulative causation falls short and the 
symmetric equilibrium is the only stable outcome. However, another reason for the 
market size to be endogenous is the presence of input-output linkages between firms: 
what is an output for a firm is an input for another. Intermediate production 
represents a big share of the industrial output. For example, in the United States, 
intermediate consumption of goods accounted for almost 69% of the total production 
manufactured in 1997. Besides the standard competition effect, the entry of a new 
firm in a region also increases the market size of upstream firms-suppliers (market size 
effect) and decreases the costs of downstream firms-customers (cost effect). In such 
a context, the agglomeration of the final and intermediate sectors in a particular region 
may occur because firms want to be close to their customers or suppliers. 
 
This alternative setting allows one to shed light on two new forces that are likely to 
play a major role in the evolution of the space-economy (Krugman and Venables, 1995). 
When more firms are concentrated in a region where the supply of labor is totally 
inelastic, they will end up paying higher wages to their workers if the size of the two 
industrial sectors becomes large. This has two opposing effects for the core region. On 
the one hand, the final demand in this region increases because consumers enjoy higher 
incomes there. We find again a force of agglomeration linked to final demand, as in 
K r u g m a n .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  i s  n o  l o n g e r  t r i g g e r e d  b y  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  
population, but by an increase in individual incomes. On the other hand, the same 
phenomenon generates a force of dispersion, which feeds the fear of de-
industrialization, that is, the high labor costs that prevail in the core. If wages are 
much lower in the periphery, beyond some level of integration, firms will find it 









































1core. In doing so, they have the possibility to produce at lower costs while keeping a 
very good access to the core region.
11
 
Thus, if the impact of economic integration highlighted in section 3 - namely, the 
strengthening of regional inequalities - continues to appear up to a certain level of 
integration, the inverse process is set in motion beyond this level, thus showing that the 
pursuit of economic integration contributes to a decrease in regional inequalities. We 
therefore find a re-industrialization of the periphery and even a possible, and 
simultaneous, de-industrialization of the core. This new phenomenon of regional 
convergence, which arises here for very high degrees of integration, concurs with the 
prediction that re-equilibrating forces in favor of peripheral zones come into play once 
transport costs have reached a sufficiently low level. The relocation of some activities 
in the new Member States of the European Union seems to confirm the plausibility of 
such an evolution (Brülhart, 2006).  
 
4.4 The spatial fragmentation of firms 
 
A growing number of firms choose to break down their production process into various 
stages spread across different regions. Specifically, the modern firm organizes and 
performs discrete activities in distinct locations, which altogether form a supply chain 
starting at the conception of the product and ending at its delivery. This spatial 
fragmentation of production aims at taking advantage of differences in technologies, 
factor endowments, or factor prices across places (Feenstra, 1998; Spulber, 2007). The 
most commonly observed pattern is such that firms re-locate their production activities 
in low-wage regions or countries, while keeping their strategic functions (e.g. 
management, R&D, marketing and finance) concentrated in a few affluent urban regions 
where the high-skilled workers they need are available. 
 
In such a context, the development of new communication technologies is a major force 
t h a t  s h o u l d  b e  a c c o u n t e d  f o r .  I t  g o e s  h a n d  i n  h a n d  w i t h  t h e  g r o w i n g  r o l e  o f  
transportation firms in the global logistics. With this in mind, two types of spatial costs 
must then be considered, namely communication costs and transport costs. Low 
transport costs allow firms producing overseas to sell their output on their home 
market at a low price. Equally important, but perhaps less recognized, is the fact that 
coordinating activities within a firm is more costly when headquarters and plant are 
physically separated because the transmission of information remains incomplete and 
imperfect (Leamer and Storper, 2001). However, lower communication costs make 
coordination easier and, therefore, facilitate the process of fragmentation. More 
precisely, in order to make low-wage areas more attractive for the establishment of 
their production, firms need both the development of new communication technologies 
and substantial decreases in transport costs. 
 
                                                 









































1Assume that each firm has two units, one headquarter and one plant. All headquarters 
are located in the same region and use skilled labor, whereas plants use headquarter-
services together with unskilled labor. A firm is free to decentralize its production 
overseas by choosing distinct locations for its plant and headquarter. Apart from this 
change, the framework used is the same as in sub-section 3.2. Two main scenarios are to 
be distinguished as they lead to very different patterns (Fujita and Thisse, 2006). 
When communication costs are sufficiently high, all firms are national and established 
in the core region. Once communication costs steadily decrease, the industry moves 
toward a configuration in which some firms become multinational whereas others remain 
national. Eventually, when these costs have reached a sufficiently low level, the economy 
ends up with a de-industrialized core that retains only firms' strategic functions. 
 
A fall in transport costs may lead to fairly contrasted patterns of production. In 
particular, two scenarios are to be considered. When communication costs are high, 
reducing transport costs leads to a growing agglomeration of plants within the core, 
very much as in the core-periphery model. However, the agglomeration process is here 
gradual instead of exhibiting a bang-bang behavior. Things are totally different when 
communication costs are low. For high transport costs, most plants are still located 
within the core region. However, once these costs fall below some threshold, the re-
location process unfolds over a small range of transport cost values. This could explain 
why the process of de-industrialization of some developed regions seems, first, to be 




In a related context, Robert-Nicoud (2008) stresses a different aspect of the 
fragmentation process, which allows firms to simultaneously reap the benefit of 
agglomeration economies in the core regions and of low wages in the periphery. 
Specifically, the reduction of employment in some routine tasks in rich regions helps 
sustain and reinforce employment in the core competencies of firms in such regions. 
Consequently, the loss of some (unskilled) jobs permits to retain firms’ “core 
competencies” in the core regions as well as the corresponding (skilled) jobs. By 
contrast, preventing firms to outsource abroad their routine tasks is likely to induce 
them to relocate their entire activities in the periphery, thus destroying all jobs in 
what was the core. 
 
Thus, by facilitating the vertical disintegration of firms, lower communication costs are 
likely to have a deep impact on the structure of employment in developed countries. It 
should be clear that the interaction between communication costs and transport costs 
has become a critical issue for the future of the space-economy. 
 
 
                                                 
12  The re-dispersion of firms, which occurs through their fragmentation, rests on the existence of sufficiently 
strong interregional wage differentials. Any force that narrows down the wage gap thus thwarts the re-









































15. How to measure transport costs and their impact on the 
distribution of activities? 
 
In NEG models, the transport sector is a silent sector. To a large extent, this is 
because economists have a fairly simplistic view of transport costs, which leads them to 
disregard several important dimensions stressed by transportation economists (Rietveld 
and Vickerman, 2004). Yet, such measures are crucial when we come to the evaluation of 
the impact of lowering transport costs on the spatial distribution of activities in real-
world economies. 
 
5.1 The measurement of transport costs 
 
Most NEG models build on the standard iceberg formulation of transport costs. Albeit 
popularized by Samuelson (1954), the iceberg frame goes back to von Thünen (1826) 
who argued that transport costs would be given by the amount of grains consumed by 
horses pulling the loaded carriages. In line with this metaphor, most NEG models rest 
on the assumption that moving commodities incurs the loss of a given share of the load. 
Modeling transport costs as if goods were truly “melting” en route is a convenient 
analytical device that circumvents the need to consider the transport sector per se and 
its related interactions with other markets. More precisely, the iceberg formulation 
implies that transport costs are multiplicative to the “free-on-board” (FOB) price of 
products, so that any increase in this price raises freight charges proportionally. 
Conversely, any increase in the iceberg cost translates into a larger delivered or “cost-
insurance-freight” (CIF) price. Denoting by p the FOB price and by p* the CIF price, 
the freight rate is  *1 pp τ = − . 
 
In that spirit, the first generation of NEG empirics uses two series of transport cost 
proxies. The first one is the share of GDP spent in transport activities. In the US, 
Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004) report that this share has fallen from about 10% in late 
nineteenth century to about 3% nowadays. Adding logistic and transport activities 
yields a larger share of 9.5% (Wilson, 2006). 
 
However, the share of transport and logistic expenditures in GDP provides only a lower 
bound for actual transport costs because it neglects two major features. First, national 
accounts exclude in-house transport, which may account for up to 15% of transport 
activities in a country such as France. Second, a large share of GDP is not shipped 
across locations. Hence, the above data provides at best very crude approximations of 
actual transport expenditures on traded goods. It seems therefore preferable to 
evaluate transport costs from other sources. 
 
Based on customs data, transport costs may be computed as the ratio between the CIF 
value of a traded flow reported by the importing country, which is inclusive of freight 









































1exclusive of these charges. The CIF/FOB transport margin is commodity-specific and 
varies with the origin-destination route. Unfortunately, for many countries, especially 
developing ones, this technique yields large inconsistencies that are mostly due to 
discrepancies in trade reporting techniques (Hummels and Lugovskyy, 2006). 
 
In a few importing nations, such as New Zealand, the US or Latin America countries 
(Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), freight expenditures are directly 
reported in import customs declarations. For these countries, the ratio of freight 
charges to import values yields a transport cost that is purged from the 
aforementioned inconsistencies. Building on this method, Hummels (2001) reports 
considerable variation in freight rates across importers, exporting routes and goods. 
The US is shown to have the lowest transport costs with a 3.8% margin, which is around 
4-fold that of a land-locked country such as Paraguay (13.3%). Hummels (2007) 
evaluates that, even for the median US good shipped, the related freight rate was nine 
times larger than the corresponding tariff duty in 2004. Along the same line, the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), which provides one of the most disaggregated 
databases on import customs declarations, reports average transport margins that 
would range, for the US, between 0.4% (cobalt ores) and 136% (grapefruit).
13 The 
variability across routes is also very large, the lower and upper bounds being for, 
respectively, the countries close to the US (Canada and Mexico) and distant trading 
partners such as Australia. 
 
Nonetheless, a warning is in order regarding the use of transport margins computed 
from trade data. A major pitfall of this method is that freight expenditures might be 
low because trade strategies are designed by firms and carriers to reduce transport 
costs. If traders substitute away from goods or routes with relative high freight costs, 
the picture drawn from trade margins could be misleading, and the real average level of 
transport costs vastly underestimated. In addition, null flows, which remain mostly 
ignored in empirical analyses, probably mean that the transport costs of some goods are 
prohibitive. A well-known example is provided by the non-tradable goods whose share in 
households’ and firms’ consumption is large. One way to circumvent both the 
endogeneity of transport margins and its related trade composition effects is to 
identify the various factors that determine the absolute level of freight costs, a 
question to which we now move. 
 
The cost of shipping commodities across regions depends on several variables. The most 
common functional form used in empirical works transport costs builds on the success 
story of the gravity model, which has been the workhorse of new trade theories 
(Feenstra, 2004). It is given by the following expression: 
 
) , , (
1
0 j i ij ij ij X X X f Dist t
δ δ =       (1) 
 
                                                 









































1where  0 δ  is a parameter evaluating the overall efficiency of the transport sector. , 
 is the distance between the region of origin i and the region of destination j, ij Dist
14  1 δ  
a parameter measuring the inverse distance-decay effect, while   is a separable 
function of three vectors of variables, namely the non-distance pair-specific ( ), 
origin-specific and destination-specific factors affecting transport costs (  and  . 
Typical variables and their impact are described below. 
f
ij X
i X j X
 
First, transport involves industry-specific costs, which depend on the nature and the 
quality of the commodity shipped. These costs are often approximated by the weight to 
value ratio of goods, which captures the scale effects generated by high trade volumes 
and the differences in both the transportability (bulk size) and the quality of goods 
(damage liabilities). Hummels (2001) estimates that the elasticity of the weight to value 
r a t i o  i s  v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  d i s t a n c e  ( c l o s e  t o  0 . 2 5 ) ,  w h i c h  m e a n s  t h a t  d o u b l i n g  
either the unit value of goods or the distance covered yields an increase in transport 
costs equal to 19% = (2
0.25 - 1) x 100.
15 However, these elasticities significantly vary 
across transport modes. For example, an additional mile is far more expensive for air 
(from 27% up to 43%) than for ocean freight (15%), while a marginal increase in the 
unit value of goods has a lower impact on road transport costs than on air or rail freight 
rates (Hummels, 2007). Albeit important, the weight to value ratio is difficult to 
observe at the interregional level or within free-trade areas and, absent data,   is 
often non-industry specific. 
ij t
 
Second, whenever shipments have to cross borders, transit delays, custom inspections, 
changes in bulk standards or transport mode switching involve additional charges. Once 
again, absent data, such losses are often captured by a dummy equal to one if i and j are 
separated by a border and to zero otherwise. Conversely, trade may be facilitated by 
international agreements, technological progress, transit infrastructure, integrated 
transport networks (for instance between neighboring countries), or smooth geography. 
For instance, Limão and Venables (2001) consider adjacency (a dummy indicating 
whether i and j have a common border), landlockness (two dummies indicating whether i 
and j do not have access to the sea), insularity (two dummies indicating whether i and j 
are islands), and infrastructure density (both between and within i and j). According to 
their estimates, in comparison with a coastal country, a landlocked country would bear 
an additional transport cost of 50%, which could be overcome partially by improving 
onshore and transit infrastructure. By improving its infrastructure from the median to 
the top 25
th percentile, a country would save about 13% in transport costs, which would 
be equivalent to make it 2358km closer to its trading partners. Micco and Serebrisky 
                                                 
14  At the level of macro-regions, it usually refers to the geodesic distance between the main cities of the origin 
and destination regions. 
15  Note also that, quite unexpectedly, physical distance does not only matter for commodity flows. Blum and 
Goldberg (2006) find that, for taste-dependent differentiated digital products (such as music or electronic 
games), a 1% increase in distance reduces the number of websites visits by 3.25%, once controlled for key 









































1(2006) find that improving airport accessibility and size from the first quartile (say 
Uzbekistan or Honduras) to the third quartile (say France) would reduce air transport 
costs by 10%. Along the same line, Clark et al. (2004) evaluate the role of seaport 
efficiency by combining both the effects of port infrastructure and quality in cargo 
handling services. Their results suggest that improving port efficiency from the 25
th 
bottom percentile (say Ethiopia or Ecuador) to the 25
th top percentile (say Singapore or 
Hong Kong) would reduce shipping costs by more than 12%, which amounts to a shrinking 
of the average distance by 500 miles.  
 
In the same vein, the intensity of competition and the level of technological change in 
the transport sector are two other critical and interrelated determinants of transport 
cost variations. For example, commercial routes are less subject to monopoly power as 
competition pushes down mark-ups and induces carriers to partially absorb variations in 
transport costs, yielding incomplete pass-through (Hummels et al., 2007). In other 
words, restrictions imposed by strongly regulated transport regimes might contribute 
to increase transport fees. Fink et al. (2002) provide an illuminating example of how 
collusion influences the level of transport costs. They estimate that anti-competitive 
practices, such as maritime conferences that facilitate informal price agreements 
among liner companies, would add a premium of up to 25% to ocean transport costs.
 
Consequently, transport deregulation could well lead to a large reduction in freight 
rates. For example, liberalizing port services would be equivalent to decreasing maritime 
transport costs by 9% (Fink et al., 2002), while moving the air transport competition 
regime to a system of Open Sky agreements would give rise to a similar decline in air 
cargo costs (Micco and Serebrisky, 2006). Innovation in the transport or logistic 
industry may either alleviate or strengthen competition. For example, in maritime 
transport containerization has triggered large freight cost reductions in cargo handling 
and increasing cargo transshipments, which in turn have favored international tramping 
and the hub-organization of maritime routes (Mohammed and Williamson, 2003; 
Levinson, 2006). Hummels (2007) also argues that improvements in avionics, wing design, 
materials, together with the adoption of jet engines, would have yielded a 10-fold 
decline in air shipping prices since the late 1950s. 
 
Third, and last, notwithstanding the direct monetary cost of shipments, time becomes 
an increasingly relevant dimension in transport because firms and consumers have an 
increasing willingness to pay for fast delivery. For example, Hummels (2007) argues 
that manufacturing firms would be willing to pay 0.8% of the value of goods (equivalent 
to a 16% tariff) to save one day of ocean shipping. Furthermore, switching from slow to 
fast transport (e.g. from maritime vessels to steamers or air shipping) would have been 
equivalent to a 4-fold reduction in the tariffs on manufactured goods. Time is crucial 
for instance in the fashion business: the shorter the product cycle, the better a 
retailer can respond to changes in demand, reduce unsold inventory, and avoid shortage 
of popular items. Evans and Harrigan (2005) do observe that the sources of US apparel 









































1could be delivered by nearby countries.  Hence, even though fast transport is far more 
expensive, freight costs are pushed upward by the increasing desire for fast delivery.  
 
In order to account for most of the aforementioned elements, Combes and Lafourcade 
(2005) use the concept of generalized transport cost, and combine both several 
distance and time monetary costs, which depend directly on competition, technology, 
infrastructure, and energy prices.
16 Based on a shift-share analysis of these different 
components for road transport, they find out that the 38% average decline in freight 
costs that has occurred between 1978 and 1998 in France was mostly triggered by 
technological improvements and deregulation. By contrast, the infrastructure and fuel 
costs contributions were only marginal (about 3%). This highlights the fact that 
transport liberalization might be more effective in reducing freight rates than a larger 
supply of transport infrastructures, at least for developed countries. At this stage, it is 
worth noting that the “ESPON programme” has developed a very detailed Geographic 
Information System (GIS) that permits to compute generalized transport costs 
between European regions for road, rail and air transport networks.
17
 
5.2 How transport costs affect the location of activities: the 
simulation of large-scale models  
 
NEG empirics use transport cost functions such as expression (1) to simulate the impact 
of decreasing transport costs between economies involving several regions/countries 
and industries. Applied NEG is still in its infancy however, and very few studies have 
actually succeeded in testing NEG theoretical predictions in their structural, and not 
simply reduced, form. 
 
A first example is provided by Forslid et al. (2002) who simulate the changes in the 
location of 14 industries following trade liberalization across four large European areas 
(North, East, West and South). To this end, they develop a large-scale computable 
general equilibrium model with vertical linkages, and experiment with successive 
variations in trade costs, among which tariffs and US-GTAP transport margins are 
extrapolated to Europe. The most abrupt changes in location patterns arise in three 
industries - textiles, leather, and food products - which all move out from their initial 
location to agglomerate in the area endowed with the largest comparative advantage. 
Most of the other industries – metals, chemicals, transport equipment and machinery - 
exhibit a bell-shaped pattern of relocation, the gains of concentrating in the core being 
progressively offset as trade costs keep falling. Such results, therefore, corroborate 
the theoretical predictions of NEG models regarding the evolution of both location 
patterns and welfare levels. 
 
                                                 
16  For road transport, the distance-related costs include fuel, tires, and vehicle maintenance expenditures, while 
the time-related costs include drivers’ wages, insurance costs and damage liabilities, vehicle depreciation, and 
the loading time. 









































1In a recent paper, Bosker et al. (2007) calibrate the standard NEG model with vertical 
linkages on 194 NUTS2 European regions. They consider a special case of (1) and 
estimate the parameters of the expression: 
 
( ) ( ) ij ij ij X Dist t 2 0 1
1 δ δ
δ + =       ( 2 )    
 
where   is a dummy indicating whether i and j are separated by a border. They 
proceed by simulating the changes in the spatial distribution of activities sparked by a 
decrease of
ij X
0 δ . Two scenarios are considered. In the first one, labor is mobile: 
transport costs reductions strengthen the process of agglomeration, and may even yield 
a full agglomeration in the Parisian metropolitan area for very low values of  0 δ . In the 
second one, labor is immobile: lowering transport costs now leads to a bell-shaped 
agglomeration pattern. These results thus confirm the main predictions of NEG. Bosker 
et al. (2007) also provide a numerical evaluation of  0 δ  that would match the top of the 
bell-shaped curve. Interestingly, the corresponding pattern of activities fits a banana-
shaped corridor, known as the “Blue Banana”, stretching from southern Britain down to 
northern Italy, passing through Brussels, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Zurich. It covers 
one the world’s highest concentration of people, wealth and industry. Note, however, 
that this corridor is not homogenous in that it contains quite a few “holes”, very much 
as an affluent city has poor neighbourhoods. 
 
Combes and Lafourcade (2007) allow the function   to be commodity-specific by 
assuming that freight charges incurred for each industry vary proportionally to the 
generalized transport cost discussed above. They estimate the proportion factor for 10 
different industries, using a NEG model with vertical linkages. Plugging these estimates 
into the equilibrium conditions, they observe that a 30% drop in generalized transport 
costs would result in a more balanced distribution of employment across French regions, 
with different degrees of adjustment according to the sectors. By way of contrast, 
they find that the degree of spatial concentration increases within a large number of 




Using the ESPON database, Bröcker (2005) assesses the spatial impact of four 
different scenarios of the EU transport policy and evaluates the resulting welfare 
variations for NUTS3 regions. The first two scenarios consist of implementing the list 
of Trans-European Networks priority projects, which aim to improve the accessibility 
of lagging EU regions. The third scenario analyses the effects of imposing a toll on the 
entire European road network. The last scenario is a mixture of infrastructure and 
price policies. Interestingly, infrastructure policies are shown to be pro-cohesive in 
that they favor a balanced and polycentric spatial development, whereas pricing policies 










































1The main limit of most existing empirical studies lies in the fact that firms are not 
allowed to relocate following changes in transport costs. Variations in spatial disparities 
and welfare are translated only through changes in existing firms’ sizes and prices, as 
well as in transport modes. Dealing with the endogenous choice of locations is one of the 
main tasks on the research agenda. 
 
 
6. What are the policy implications and where should we go now? 
 
Standard trade theories tell us indirectly how economic activities might be distributed 
across space. In Ricardian and Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theories, regions specialize 
according to their comparative advantage in terms of their relative productivity levels 
or factor abundance. On the contrary, NEG argues that the location of activity, hence 
the pattern of trade and the demand for transport services, is driven by the 
interaction between scale economies, market size and transport costs.  
 
One of the main accomplishments of NEG is to show that policies aiming at reducing 
transport costs affect social welfare in new ways as firms and workers are to relocate 
in response to long-run changes in freight rates and consumer prices. When locations 
are fixed, freight-reducing policies affect trade flows as well as commodity prices. 
They are likely to reduce static dead-weight losses arising from market power in the 
manufacturing sector by making the market for these goods more integrated and, 
therefore, more competitive. However, once locations are endogenous, such policies may 
generate new dead-weight losses due to the possible sub-optimal redistribution of firms 
and workers across regions (see sub-section 3.4). For example, according to the core-
periphery model, falling transport costs should lead to the agglomeration of firms and 
workers in a handful of affluent urban areas, whereas many regions would accommodate 
a low level of economic life.
18 If true, the development of more efficient transport 
infrastructure would exacerbate regional disparities, a result opposite to what 
transport authorities expect.
19 Furthermore, by making cheaper the transport of 
commodities in both directions, one must keep in mind that the construction of a new 
infrastructure facilitates an increase of imports to, just as well as an increase of 
exports from, the small region. As a result, the opening-up of the small region may pull 
out some of its firms. More precisely, once transport costs have sufficiently decreased, 
preliminary results suggest that the most efficient firms desert the periphery to move 
to the core (Baldwin and Okubo, 2006). 
 
NEG, therefore, sheds light on the fact that European regional policies fail to deliver 
their expected outcome because they do not rest on good assessments of the spatial 
impacts of new transport infrastructure (Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002; 
                                                 
18  Unlike what anti-globalization activists believe, trade is not intrinsically responsible for the existence of 
regional disparities. Behrens (2004) has shown that prohibitive trade costs do not rule out the formation of a 
core-periphery structure.  









































1Vickerman et al., 1999). For the development of such infrastructure to attract new 
firms, the local market must be sufficiently large and/or endowed with some specific 
competitive advantage. Otherwise, a policy that systematically aims at improving the 
accessibility of a small region to the global economy runs the risk of being ineffective in 
promoting the development of  his region. Such a policy, which is one of the main tools 
used by the European Commission to reduce regional disparities, must be supplemented 
by other instruments to boost regional development. It should also be noted that, once 
a core exists, all other regions aspire to be linked to it. One of the ironies of the 
transport investments made to help peripheral regions is that it ends up strengthening 
the core. Even worse, NEG suggests that being a land-locked or remote region could well 
be a comparative advantage that allows some regions to keep their manufacturing 
sector because firms are protected by the barrier of high transport costs (Ago et al., 
2006; Behrens et al., 2006). 
t
 
Though seemingly provocative, such considerations are not entirely new. In 1885, 
Wilhelm Launhardt, a civil engineer who worked on the construction of transport 
infrastructures in Germany, observed that “the improvement of means of transport is 
dangerous for costly goods: these lose the most effective protection of all tariff 
protections, namely that provided by bad roads.” (Launhardt, 1885, page 150 of the 
English translation). It should also be emphasized that the cumulative nature of the 
agglomeration process makes such a pattern particularly robust to various types of 
shocks, thus showing why it is hard to foster a more balanced pattern of activities. In 
other words, affluent regions enjoy the existence of agglomeration rents that single-
minded policies cannot easily dissipate. Consequently, if the objective of the European 
Commission is to foster a more balanced distribution of economic activities across 
European regions, it should add more instruments to its policy portfolio. 
 
However, we have also seen that the evolution of the space-economy depends on the 
interaction between several forces that are not taken into account by the core-
periphery model. Adding new ingredients to this setting, such as the sluggish mobility of 
workers, the existence of non-tradable goods, the demand for intermediate goods, or 
the spatial fragmentation of firms, suggests the existence of a bell-shaped curve 
linking regional disparities and economic integration. Taking into account these new 
mechanisms leads us, therefore, to believe that a sufficiently extensive economic 
integration of the space-economy should favor the development of several large urban 
regions, which could be spread over the territory of the EU. Eventually, spatial 
inequalities at the interregional level would be (partially) reduced through the 
redispersion of the manufacturing sector, as in the US where this sector is increasingly 
located within medium- or low-population density areas (Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004). 
 
If, from the economic policy viewpoint, there seems to be a trade-off between 
economic efficiency and spatial equity in the first stages of the integration process, 
the foregoing means that the pursuit of integration makes it possible to win on both 









































1integration does not capitalize on all the benefits of efficiency while generating 
regional inequalities. However, there are also dynamic benefits associated with the 
spatial concentration of the R&D sector, which can boost the growth of the global 
economy.  We must bear in mind, therefore, that the reduction of spatial inequalities is 
probably not costless for the economy as a whole (see sub-sections 3.5 and 5.2). 
 
One of the main limitations of NEG for guiding transport analysts is the use of a two-
region framework. Extending this framework to the case of an arbitrary number of 
regions appears to be a formidable task. The new fundamental ingredient that a multi-
regional setting brings about is that the accessibility to markets varies across regions 
(Thomas, 2002).
20 In particular, one expects the relative position of regions within the 
transport space to affect the interregional distribution of firms. In this perspective, 
one of the most ambitious and interesting works is provided by Behrens et al. (2005), 
who show that the home market effect discussed in sub-section 3.2 can be extended 
once they account for the relative position of markets, which is itself described by a 
matrix of transport costs. Another distinctive feature of a multi-regional setting is to 
allow for the existence of transport networks in which some regions are central nodes, 
whereas other regions are poorly connected to the rest of the economy. In this 
perspective, it should be kept in mind that standard location theory has used partial 
equilibrium models to derive many results that are potentially interesting to 
transportation economists.
21 These results could be combined with NEG in order to 
understand better how the shape and structure of transport networks may affect the 
spatial distribution of activities.  
 
Along the same lines, empirical evidence reveals that the growing openness of national 
economies to international trade has a significant impact on the location of economic 
activities within countries (Ades and Glaeser, 1995). The above-mentioned difficulty in 
characterizing the spatial distribution of economic activity across many locations, as 
well as a genuine distinction between regions and countries, has limited such 
investigations. Countries and regions are to be distinguished from each other in terms 
of both shipping costs and factor mobility. Specifically, shipping goods between regions 
is typically cheaper than shipping them between countries. Moreover, factor mobility is 
often much lower between than inside countries. Moreover, trade is hampered by 
transport costs between regions and by trade costs between countries. Preliminary 
analysis suggests that lower intra-national transport costs foster regional 
agglomeration within countries when international trade costs are high; by contrast, low 
international trade costs push toward regional dispersion when intra-national transport 
costs are high (Martin and Rogers, 1995; Behrens et al., 2007). In the same vein, we 
have seen that reductions in intra-national transport costs may trigger the 
interregional dispersion of activities together with their agglomeration at the infra-
regional level (Combes and Lafourcade, 2007). Although much remains to be done, such 
                                                 
20  It is worth recalling, in passing, that the simplest firm location model accounts for the fact that the access to 
several markets is the key-issue faced by a firm making a location choice. 









































1results point to the need for coordinating national/regional transport policies and 
international agreements that affect the level of trade costs across countries. 
 
It should also be emphasized that, despite the more and more precise measurement of 
(generalized) transport costs, NEG still fails to provide an explicit description of the 
interactions between the transport and manufactured sectors as well as between 
carriers themselves. In particular, modeling explicitly the transport sector and the 
formation of freight rates through the strategic behavior of carriers, as well as 
competition between transport modes, should attract more attention. Furthermore, 
integrating variables specific to the transport sector, such as density economies, 
market segmentation in the supply of transport services, logistic features, time value or 
external costs arising from pollution and congestion, should also be addressed to make 
NEG more appealing and relevant to transportation economists. As such variables are 
likely to push up freight rates, it seems reasonable to study the opposite thought 
experiment of NEG, i.e. what are the consequences of increasing transport costs. This 
entire area is strongly under-analyzed and deserves much more attention in the future 
research agenda. Finally, NEG has totally neglected to account for the costs of 
infrastructure, being content to assume that transport costs go up or down 
exogenously. 
 
To conclude, we find it fair to say that NEG provides a broad conceptual framework to 
study the articulation between transport policies designed at the local and global levels. 
In particular, NEG allows one to understand how different types of trade costs 
generated at different spatial scales, such as commuting and shopping costs, 
interregional shipping costs and international trade costs, interact to shape the whole 
economy in ways that are not straightforward to imagine. This aspect of transport 
policy is often overlooked by decision-makers who tend to focus on a single spatial scale, 
neglecting the various implications that their policy recommendations may have at other 
levels of analysis. More generally, because NEG raises questions directly related to 
several economic fields, it also highlights the importance for transport analysts to pay 
more attention to the implications of decisions made in domains that are at first sight 
far from their interests. 
 
Despite its many restrictive features, NEG has thus succeeded to throw light on issues 
that had remained unexplained for a long time. However, it is true that more work is 
called for if the purpose is to make NEG operational to transport analysts. Specifically, 
there is a need for computable and calibrated general spatial equilibrium models coping 
with vertical linkages and including several sectors and regions. In this perspective, 
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